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RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' "FACTS" 
While most if not all of the "facts" presented by Appellants are either not 
established "facts" at all or are not relevant to the certified questions, Metal Ware feels that a 
response to some of them is necessary so that the record is accurate and the attempt to inflame 
this matter and portray Metal Ware as a "bad actor" is properly refuted. For example, Farmers 
Fact No. 17 states that Metal Ware received notice of a "defective" dehydrator in Oklahoma in 
1997. However, there is no evidence at all that the unit involved in that minor fire incident was 
defective at all, much less that the defect was the same as the defect involved in the recall. 
Furthermore, Facts Nos. 24 and 25 are incorrect statements. The U.S. District Court did not hold 
that Metal Ware had a duty to warn the Tabors, and it did not "reject" Metal Ware's argument 
that it had no knowledge of the Tabors. To the contrary, the Record clearly reflects that the 
District Court determined that " . . . Metal Ware had really no duty to warn them [the 
Tabors]. They didn't know about them." (See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:10-12, 
Aplee. Supp. App. at 15.). In that same vein, the Tabors' Fact No. 27 incorrectly states 
that it is "uncontradicted that Metal Waie had in its possession information that the 
Tabors filled out a product registration card . . .." That statement is not accurate, and the 
Record in this case makes it clear that Metal Ware had no information at all indicating the 
Tabors had purchased any American Harvest product. Additionally, the Tabors Fact No. 
33 is correct but very misleading. It was expected that ShopKo had such units on its shelf 
after the recall because FD-50 models were still manufactured after the recall and after 
the changes to the product to address the defect, and they are still for sale today. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah Should Continue to Follow its Current Precedent, and Appellants offer 
no Reasons for Doing Otherwise 
A. Appellants Miss the Mark Completely in Their Briefing 
Both Appellants completely miss the mark by failing to address the 
questions which have been certified to this Court. Appellants fail to offer any persuasive 
reasons for adopting either of the minority, non-traditional theories of successor 
liability-/. £., continuity of enterprise or product line. In fact, they fail to offer any reasons 
at all, electing instead to simply attempt to re-argue the facts of this case (as they perceive 
them) under the rubric of the two theories as though they already were the law in Utah. 
(See, e.g., Br. of Farmers at 21-24; Br. of Tabors at 29-32). This case is not here as a 
second appeal, but rather on certain certified questions. Appellants leap past the entire 
point of the certification, and attempt to argue for liability as though the theories were 
already the law in Utah. They present unsupported facts and use inflammatory language 
in an effort to lure this Court into a knee jerk reaction based upon the Appellant's spin on 
this case instead of focusing on why either theory should be applied as the law in Utah in 
all cases. 
It is undisputed that in Utah "[t]he general rule is that a successor 
corporation is not responsible for the torts of a predecessor entity," subject to four narrow 
2 
exceptions.1 See Certification at p. 4; Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT 
App 230, K 15, 986 P.2d 748, 752; see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability § 12 (2003). The certified question before this Court is whether Utah should 
abandon the traditional rule and instead adopt either the product line or continuity of 
enterprise theory. Instead of offering argument and authority concerning the adoption of 
either theory, Appellants instead simply assume the theories already apply, and then 
attempt to argue why they should prevail in this case. The misguided effort to simply 
apply the "facts" of this case to a minority rule that has not even been adopted in Utah is 
of no assistance to this Court in view of the certified questions presented. 
Both Appellants also improperly argue for liability under the traditional 
exceptions of Macris. For example, Farmers' opening argument is that the traditional 
exceptions to successor non-liability apply (Br. of Farmers at 17.), and the "Tabors 
maintain that at least one factor exists of the four [traditional] factors[.]" (Br. of Tabors 
at 20). These arguments are completely unavailing for at least two reasons. First, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not ask this Court to decide whether one or more of 
the traditional exceptions to successor non-liability apply in this case. Rather, the Tenth 
1
 The traditional exceptions impose liability on an asset purchaser successor when: 
"(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume [the selling corporation's 
liabilities]; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of seller and 
purchaser [i.e., a de facto merger]; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation 
of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to 
escape liability for such debts." Macris, 1999 UT App 230 at f^ 15, 986 P.2d 748 (quoting 
Fiorom, 867 F.2d at 575 n. 2.) 
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Circuit asked this Court to determine whether Utah would abandon the traditional rule 
already in place (along with its exceptions) and adopt either the product line or continuity 
of enterprise theory. Second, none of the traditional exceptions-which are already the 
law in Utah-were ever raised or argued by any party in the U.S. District Court. The U.S. 
District Court correctly stated that "[n]o party has argued that any of the four recognized 
exceptions to the general rule of successor corporation non-liability applies in the present 
case." (Aplt. Farmers' Appendix to Tenth Circuit at 64-65, Order, Docket Entry #98 at 
pp. 12-13). The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged in the certification order that "none of 
[the traditional four exceptions] had been argued or applied in the case." (Certification 
Order at 3). Thus, the Maoris exceptions are not properly before this Court, and are not 
material to this certification in any event. 
B. The Majority Rule Should Continue to Be Utah Law 
Vast authority from other jurisdictions and from our own Utah Court of 
Appeals supports continued adherence to the traditional rule of Maoris, which is the 
majority U.S. rule. See Decius v. Action Collection. Service Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ]f 8, 
105 P.3d 956. See also e.g, Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) 
("The general rule in the majority of American jurisdictions . . . is that a corporation 
which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the 
selling corporation."). Since the product line theory was first adopted in California, only 
a very few (five) jurisdictions have ever followed, and since the continuity of enterprise 
4 
theory was adopted in Michigan, only a very few (three) jurisdictions have adopted that 
theory. All other jurisdictions (thirty-two) have rejected the non-traditional product line 
and continuity of enterprise exceptions and adhered to the traditional rule of Section 12 of 
the Restatement (as reflected in Utah in Macris).2 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the traditional rule is 
still the rule in Utah in Decius v. Action Collection. Service Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ^ 8, 
105 P.3d 956. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Fish v. Ams ted Industries, Inc., 
376 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Wis. 1985), for the proposition that the legislature is better suited 
to change the law of successor liability. See Decius, 2004 UT App 484 at 1HJ8-15, 105 
P.3d 956. In the end, the Utah Court of Appeals expressly "decline[d] to expand 
successor liability." Id. at f 18. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the continuity 
of enterprise theory, noted that any changes to successor liability away from the 
traditional rule are best left to the legislature, and found no reason to move beyond the 
traditional rule. 
Not only is the traditional rule the majority rule, but it is also the better 
reasoned rule according to the Restatement and the majority of courts. According to the 
Restatement, the traditional rule is supported by fairness and efficiency considerations. 
Imposing liability on asset purchase successors "would, for no compelling reason, impede 
2
 Opinions from the various jurisdictions are outlined in Metal Ware's opening 
brief. (See Br. of Metal Ware at 21-22.) 
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the free alienability of corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of 
capital and increasing social costs;" and extending successor liability beyond the four 
traditional exceptions "would, in the judgment of most courts, be unfair and socially 
wasteful." Id. The non-traditional exceptions espoused by Plaintiffs are also 
"inconsistent with the principle of products liability law that imposes responsibility on the 
party who created the risk and was in a position to prevent its occurrence" because they 
impose liability on an entity that was never in the chain of distribution and never placed 
the product into the stream of commerce." Id. 
The traditional rule is also founded on the longstanding rule of products 
liability law that those who are liable for a product defect are those who manufacture, 
sell, or distribute a product - i.e., those in the chain of distribution. See Restatement 
(Third) of the Law of Torts: Product Liability § 12 cmt. a (1998). The product line and 
continuity of enterprise theories extend liability to non-sellers who are not in the chain of 
distribution, and this is "not consistent with at least one major premise of strict liability, 
which is to place responsibility for a defective product on the manufacturer who placed 
that product into commerce." Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 
1982). On this point, the Appellants make the misleading and erroneous statement that if 
they cannot recover from Metal Ware, they are left without a remedy. {See Br. of Tabors 
at 26, 31, 34; Br. of Farmers at 18.) This is simply not true. Plaintiffs settled with and 
recovered significant sums from both the retailer (ShopKo) and the wholesaler 
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(Englewood)-the two entities in the chain of distribution. (See Br. of Farmers at p. I, 
noting that Shopko and Englewood "settled out"). The Tabors also continue to seek 
recovery from the manufacturer of the product, American Harvest, Inc., of Minnesota. 
(See Br. of Tabors to Tenth Circuit at 34, seeking default judgment against the 
manufacturer; Br. of Metal Ware to Tenth Circuit at 53-54, discussing implications of 
recourse against the manufacturer). Because the Tabors and Farmers already recovered 
several hundred thousand dollars from ShopKo and Englewood, entities in the chain of 
distribution, it is improper and untrue for them to claim they are "left without a remedy" 
if Metal Ware is not a viable target for them. 
The Tabors repeatedly suggest that the asset purchase between Metal Ware 
and American Harvest, Inc., somehow constituted a "hawkish" business practice. (Br. of 
Tabors at 22, 32, 33, 43.) The Tabors criticize Metal Ware and American Harvest for 
structuring the asset purchase to avoid product liability exposure to Metal Ware as an 
asset purchaser. (See Br. of Tabors at 24.) Such language and argument that Metal Ware 
somehow defrauded the Tabors by structuring the deal with American Harvest as an asset 
purchase is unfounded, inflammatory, and improper. The law has long recognized the 
general rule of non-liability of an asset purchaser. See, e.g., Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 230, ^ 15, 986 P.2d 748; Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., 802 
F.2d 75, 77-78 (3d. Cir. 1986) ("Under the well-settled rule of corporate law, where one 
company sells or transfers all of its assets to another, the second entity does not become 
7 
liable for the debts and liabilities, including torts, of the transferor.") (citation to 
secondary authority omitted).3 For the Tabors to claim that an entity that acquires assets 
through an asset purchase agreement is somehow engaged in a "hawkish" business deal is 
nothing more than hyperbole. Additionally, the Appellants ignore the fact that this case 
involves a USCPSC recall proceeding that was initiated, undertaken, and then closed by 
the USCPSC in 1995-two years before Metal Ware became involved at all. Appellant's 
correctly acknowledge that the USCPSC "imposed a continuing obligation on American 
Harvest," (Farmer's Br. At p. 3), but they then attempt to impose some sort of duty on 
Metal Ware, ignoring the admitted fact that the recall obligation ran only to American 
Harvest, and never to Metal Ware. 
The Tabors' brief actually supports Metal Ware's position that the issue of 
successor liability is best addressed by the Legislature. The Tabors point out that the 
Utah Legislature has, in fact, delved into products liability law. (Br. of Tabors at 38-39, 
referring to the Utah Products Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 to -7 (2006), in 
opining on the views of the Legislature with respect to products liability). As Metal Ware 
3
 While the longstanding rule permits asset purchases of "all of the assets of one 
entity to another," it is worth noting that the asset purchase between Metal Ware and 
American Harvest, Inc., was not an agreement by Metal Ware to purchase all of 
American Harvest, Inc.'s assets. Rather, the asset purchase agreement was to purchase 
only certain American Harvest product lines, (see Br. of Metal Ware at 9, ^[3; Tabor's 
Appendix to Tenth Circuit at 424-425, setting forth asset purchase agreement that lists 
specific assets acquired), and the Tabor's suggestion otherwise is inaccurate. (See Br. of 
Tabors at 36.) 
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discussed in its opening brief, the Restatement and leading cases on the asset purchase 
successor liability issues before this court assert that legislatures are in a better position 
than the courts to address these issues. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts, 
Product Liability § 12, Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale (1998) at p.9 of Exhibit B to 
Metal Ware's Opening Brief, quoting Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 
(Wis. 1985) ("[T]he legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy 
decisions in actions based on products liability law."); Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 
F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[C]ourts are ill-equipped . . . to balance equities among 
future plaintiffs and defendants . . . such broad public policy issues are best handled by 
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate."), and citing 
other cases; see also Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1047-1050 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003) (outlining and adopting the very approach espoused by Metal Ware). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated that modification of corporate 
and products liability law to expand successor liability is better left to the Legislature. 
Both The Tabors and Farmers cite to a paragraph in Decius that sets forth the "three 
reasons [posited] by courts for expanding successor liability." Decius, 2004 UT App 484 
at 1J14, 105 P.3d 956 (quoted in Br. of Farmers at 20; and Br. of Tabors at 27.) However, 
what both Farmers and the Tabors fail to mention is that in the very next paragraph, the 
Decius court criticizes and rejects the three reasons. Id. at f 15. The Decius court states 
that "[w]hile the notion of spreading costs exclusively on the basis of relative wealth 
9 
holds a certain Marxist charm, 'the legislature is in a better position to make [such a] 
broad public policy decision[]." Id. at \\5. The Court of Appeals then goes on to make 
clear that it udecline[s] to expand successor liability." Id. at ^ [18. 
As Metal Ware explained in detail its opening brief, there are several 
general policy arguments set forth in cases from other jurisdictions that support Metal 
Ware's position that the non-traditional theories that seek to impose liability on an asset 
purchaser must be rejected.4 The nature of these arguments, however, support the 
position that if long-standing rules of corporate succession and successor non-liability are 
going to be altered, such a change in the law is better left to the Legislature. 
4
 The stated policy reasons include: the asset purchase successor did not realize 
the profit for the product; the asset purchase successor did not create the risk presented by 
the product because it did not manufacture the product; the asset purchase successor 
cannot improve or correct the defective product that was already sold into the market by 
the manufacturer (especially where it has already been recalled by the manufacturer prior 
to the asset purchase); the asset purchase successor did not represent that the product was 
non-defective and safe by selling the product; and because the asset purchase successor 
negotiated and paid for the goodwill or reputation of the predecessor's product line in the 
asset purchase agreement, and to hold the successor liable for defects in products 
manufactured by the predecessor would be forcing the successor to pay twice for the 
goodwill of the predecessor. See, e.g., Pearson, 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002); Jones 
v. Johnson Machine & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing five 
reasons for rejecting the product line and continuity of enterprise theories); Fish, 376 
N.W.2d at 827-28; Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1144; Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931; Travis, 565 
F.2d 443, 444-45 (7th Cir.); Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 
n.5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (listing seven of the "public policies" that would be impacted by 
adopting a non-traditional theory which "impl[y] in the strongest possible terms that the 
proper province for dealing with any underlying policies is in the legislative department 
of government and not the judicial"). 
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Metal Ware reiterates that the same reasons for rejecting the product line 
theory also constitute valid reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory. See 
e.g, Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis. 1985) ("We decline to 
adopt the 'expanded continuation' exception to nonliability for the same reasons that we 
declined to adopt the product line exception."); Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts, 
Product Liability § 12 cmt. a, cmt. b, and Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale (1998). In 
addressing the product line theory, Farmers relies heavily on the New Mexico case of 
Garcia v. Coe, 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997). Garcia has been criticized and expressly 
not followed by jurisdictions cited by Metal Ware. The cases of Winsor v. Glasswerks 
PHX, LLC, 634 P.3d 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and Pearson v. Nat'I Feeding Sys., Inc., 
90 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2002), both specifically mentioned Garcia in refusing to follow the 
minority position espoused by Garcia. Moreover, in rejecting Garcia, Pearson cites to 
eleven additional cases that have rejected the position espoused by Garcia.5 
5
 Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982); Gonzalez v. Rock 
Wool Engineering & Equip. Co. Inc., 453 N.E.2d 792 (111. Ct. App. 1983); Pelc v. Bendix 
Machine Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Young v. Fulton Iron 
Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo.Ct.App.1986); Jones v. Johnson Machine & Press Co., 
320 N.W.2d 481 (1982); The Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 
118 (N..D. 1984); Flaugherv. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507N.E.2d331 (Ohio 1987); 
Hamaker v. Kenwel- Jackson Machine, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D.1986); Griggs v. 
Capitol Machine Works, 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.App.1985); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool 
Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v. AmstedIndustries Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 
1985). 
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Finally, the Tabors and Farmers both mistakenly contend that Metal Ware 
should owe them a duty based upon authority imposing duties on the manufacturer of a 
product. For example, the Tabors insist that this court should "ensure that innocent 
purchasers of defective products will have recourse against the manufacturer of the 
defective product[.]" (Br. of Tabors at 37.) They claim that the Tabors should have 
recourse against the entity that placed the product into the stream of commerce. (Br. of 
Tabors at 39.) They incorrectly assert that Metal Ware is the manufacturer of the product. 
(Br. of Tabors at 28-29.) To be clear, Metal Ware is not the manufacturer of the product. 
Metal Ware purchased certain assets from the manufacturer that placed the product into 
the stream of commerce. If Metal Ware were the manufacturer, the parties would not 
have been involved in briefing successor liability theories to the U.S. District Court, 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court for the last several years. Argument from 
the Tabors suggesting that Metal Ware should be liable based upon cases concerning the 
liability of manufacturers and sellers who placed the product into the stream of 
commerce is misguided and any legal authority regarding manufacturer duties is simply 
inapposite. 
II. This Court Should Not Create and Impose an Independent Duty to Warn on a 
Successor to an Asset Purchase Because the Matter Is Better Left to the 
Legislature, and Utah Law Already Requires a Special Relationship Before 
Imposing a Duty 
Just as they did with the minority theories discussed above, Appellants 
again simply attempt to apply the "facts" of this case to the independent duty to warn 
12 
theory as though it already applied, without analyzing why the theory should be adopted. 
Utah should not create and impose a new, independent duty to warn on a successor to an 
asset purchase. Appellants erroneously assert that Utah law imposes an independent duty 
to warn on asset purchase successors. {See Br. of Tabors at 24.). It is because Utah has 
not adopted the independent duty to warn theory that the matter was certified to this Court 
by the Tenth Circuit. Utah has never adopted an independent failure to warn theory in 
products liability law, and a decision to expand or modify products liability law is better 
left to the legislature given the broad policy implication and the possible ramifications 
that such a change may have on other areas of the law. Moreover, Utah law already 
requires a special relationship for an independent duty to be imposed, and there is no need 
to create new law and create a special duty for the asset purchase successor context. 
Even if this Court were to create and impose an independent duty to warn 
on a successor entity in the products liability context, such a duty should only arise in very 
narrow circumstances-none of which would create the duty in this case. Other 
jurisdictions impose the duty in narrow circumstances where a three part standard is met -
there is an independent, special relationship between the successor and current owner of 
the product made by the predecessor. In evaluating this three-part standard, five factors 
are considered in other jurisdictions.6 
6
 The five factors used in other jurisdictions include: (1) the asset purchase 
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product 
possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the 
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Appellants erroneously contend that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A 
constitutes authority for the independent duty to warn. (See Br. of Farmers at 25-27.) 
Plaintiffs confuse and incorrectly intermingle two wholly different and distinct legal 
duties: (1) the duty to warn owed by an entity within the chain of distribution, imposed on 
"one who sells" pursuant to Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and (2) 
the independent duty to warn theory owed by an asset purchase successor who is not in 
the chain of distribution as "one who sells." These different theories are not the same, 
and it is unavailing to intermingle legal authority discussing these separate theories.7 
Section 402A imposes strict liability upon "[those] who sell[]" within the chain of 
distribution,8 while the independent failure to warn theory, on the other hand, imposes 
asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and 
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location. 
7
 For example, Farmers cites to Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of Georgia, 
807 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ga. 1992), Khan v. Velsicol Chemical Corp,, 711 S.W.2d 310 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), Hiner v. Deere and Co., Inc., 340 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2003). (See 
Br. of Farmers at 30-32.) None of the cases cited by Farmers deals with successor 
liability, though. Instead, they discuss legal issues such as the learned intermediary 
doctrine, the liability of manufacturers and other suppliers in the chain of distribution, and 
the duties of the manufacturer after selling a recalled product. 
8
 The Restatement reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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a duty to warn on an asset purchase successor where there is an independent, special 
relationship between the asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the 
product - the person with possession of the product. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 
802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1986). Metal Ware is not "one who sells" within the chain of 
distribution, and therefore Restatement 402A and duties imposed by it and the cases 
interpreting Section 402 A do not apply. As the Texas Court of Appeals explained in 
Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works, Inc., reliance upon Restatement authority imposing 
liability against manufacturers and those in the chain of distribution is "misplaced" when 
dealing with the successor liability issues and liability of entities not within the chain of 
distribution such as those before this Court. 690 S.W.2d 287, 293. The generic term 
"duty to warn" should not be so freely used so as to confuse and incorrectly intermingle 
these two separate and distinct legal theories. See, e.g., Griggs v. Capitol Machine 
Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 291-93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that Section 402A 
only applies to those within the chain of distribution who sold the product in rejecting the 
product line theory and the plaintiffs argument that 402 A imposed a duty to warn on an 
asset purchase successor entity). 
As Metal Ware explained in detail in its opening brief, there is no need for 
this Court to create the tort of an independent duty to warn for at least two reasons. First, 
"the legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy decisions in actions 
based on products liability law." Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis. 
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1985); Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977); Restatement (Third) 
of the Law of Torts §12, Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale. Second, judicially creating a 
new duty is unnecessary given existing Utah law that a special relationship is necessary to 
impose a duty. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) ('The 
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special 
relationships exist between the parties."); Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 9-
10, 125 P.3d 906. ("[A]n omission or failure to act can generally give rise to [a duty] 
only in the presence of some external circumstance-a special relationship). This current 
"special relationship" standard is the standard imposed by the leading cases on the 
independent duty to warn theory. In the end, in order to impose an independent duty to 
warn, there must be an independent, special relationship between the asset purchase 
successor and the customer or owner of the product - the person with possession of the 
product See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1986); Gee, 615 
F.2d at 866; see also Harris v. T.I, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 610 (Va. 1992); see generally 63 
Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 138 (1997). There is no need to create new law in this 
case where no relationship of any kind existed between Metal Ware and the Tabors. 
If this Court does create and impose an independent duty to warn on post-
sale asset purchases, it should consider the three elements of the standard as articulated by 
other jurisdictions: (1) the relevant relationship - between the actual owner or possessor 
of the product and the asset purchase successor; (2) whether this relationship is a special 
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one as determined by whether there is substantial and meaningful contact; (3) whether the 
relationship has developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that 
has developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession. 
One critical aspect of the independent duty to warn issue is clarification of 
the relevant relationship. The two competing relationships are (1) the relationship 
between the asset purchase successor and the business customers of the predecessor 
including continuing wholesalers and distributors; and (2) the relationship between the 
asset purchase successor and the possessors or owners of the product who constitute end 
users or consumers of the product. The Plaintiffs acknowledge the distinction between a 
duty to warn a customer and a duty to warn an ultimate consumer. (See Br. of Farmers at 
28; Br. of Tabors at 44, offering no independent analysis but adopting Farmers' argument 
on the independent duty to warn issue). 
The relevant relationship is between the successor entity and the owner who 
possesses the product, not between the successor entity and a business customer such as a 
retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the possessor. This relationship must be a 
direct and continuing relationship with the possessor of the product. The primary reason 
for this was stated most succinctly by the Kansas Supreme Court in Stratton v. Garvey 
Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984): "Were it not so, a duty to warn 
would arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its 
predecessor's customers." id. (Emphasis added.); see also Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft 
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Service, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1981). If the relevant relationship is simply a 
determination of whether the asset purchase successor maintained a business relationship 
with wholesalers and retail customers who also did business with the predecessor 
corporation, a duty will nearly always arise, and it will essentially nullify the standard of 
requiring an independent, special relationship based upon substantial and meaningful 
contact. See Harris, 413 at 610; Polius, 802 F.2d at 84. The independent duty to warn 
should be narrowly-tailored, and should not arise in a circumstance where the location of 
the product is unknown, and it is unknown who owns or possesses the product; but the 
asset purchase successor of the company that manufactured and sold the product merely 
continued to business with a wholesaler and retailer that sold the same model of the 
defective product. 
The three part standard and the five factors all support the conclusion that 
the independent duty to warn is owed to the person who possesses or owns the product, 
i.e., an end user or consumer. The Court should not impose this narrowly-tailored 
independent duty to warn if the Court cannot identify an independent, special relationship 
based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the asset purchase successor and the 
person or entity that owns or possesses the actual, particular, defective product. To simply 
require a continued business relationship between an asset purchase successor and 
wholesalers or retailers of the product sold by the manufacturer destroys the "special" 
relationship requirement. "[T]he mere continuation of a name and acquisition of good 
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will" is insufficient to impose an independent duty to warn, Travis, 565 F.2d at 448; see 
also Gee, 615 F.2d at 866, cited in Florom, 867 F.2d at 577 (explaining that succession 
alone does not impose a duty to warn.) 
The fact that a consumer product is involved as opposed to an industrial 
product or piece of industrial machinery is another important consideration in this case. 
The first element (identifying the relevant relationship) is critical in a case involving a 
consumer product, and Metal Ware cited three cases involving consumer products that 
held that no duty was imposed on the asset purchase successor because it had no 
relationship with the end user or consumer. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 865-
66 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an asset purchase successor owed no duty to warn 
because "[tjhere [were] no facts in the record to indicate that [any successor entity] had 
any relationship with users of [the drug]"); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 
770 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding no independent duty to warn in case where there was no 
indication that [the manufacturer] had a relationship with retail customers); Tracey v 
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099, 1111-1113 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
("Emphasizing] that the relationship which gives rise to this duty is between the 
successor corporation and the particular allegedly defective product," and holding that no 
duty to warn was owed because even though the asset purchase successor performed 
maintenance on the model of shotgun involved and provided spare parts for that model, 
there was "no evidence that [asset purchase successors] performed service on the 
19 
particular shotgun involved in this case or that defendants were aware of the location of 
the shotgun or the location of its owner"). 
To impose an independent duty to warn based upon succession and 
continued wholesale and retail business would swallow the general rule of successor non-
liability. The relationship must be a direct and continuing relationship between the asset 
purchase successor and the possessor of the product. Otherwise, "a duty to warn would 
arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's 
customers." Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
The five factors demonstrate that the independent duty to warn theory is 
more applicable in the context of industrial machinery and equipment, as opposed to 
consumer goods. Metal Ware has referred the court to three consumer goods cases, and 
the courts imposed no duty of care because there was no relationship with the end user or 
consumer. See Gee, 615 F.2d at 865-66; Wessinger, 685 F. Supp. at 770; Tracey, 745 F. 
Supp. at 1111-1113. The five factors also demonstrate that the independent duty to warn 
is imposed when the asset purchase successor develops a relationship with the actual 
owner or possessor of the actual defective product, as opposed to a relationship with a 
wholesaler or retailer that distributes the same model as the model of the defective 
product. The factors do not point towards imposing a duty where the asset purchase 
successor dealt with the other products of the same make and model as the defective 
product, and serviced other products of the same make and model, without any 
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knowledge of the location of the particular defective product that caused the damage or 
who owned it. See, e.g., Tracey v. Winchester Repeating Arms Company, 745 F. Supp. 
1099, 1100-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding no duty because there was no evidence that the 
asset purchase successor performed service "on the particular shotgun involved in this 
case," and no evidence that the successor was "aware of the location of the shotgun or the 
location of its owner," despite fact that successor performed maintenance on the model at 
issue and was aware of the type of defect in that model); see also Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, 
Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1292-93, 95-96 (holding no duty because asset purchase successor 
did not perform maintenance on the particular man-lift product in grain elevator in 
Wichita that injured plaintiff, even though successor had done work on a purportedly 
similar man lift at a different location). 
Farmers criticizes Metal Ware for doing "absolutely nothing to warn the 
Tabors." (Br. of Farmers at 36.) However, the law is clear that Metal Ware had no duty 
to warn the Tabors—individuals who were completely unknown to Metal Ware. Even if 
the duty did exist, it is clear in this case that there was no practical meas to convey a 
warning to these unknown individuals. Because Metal Ware purchased the assets of the 
manufacturer of the defective product by an asset purchase, the general rule of non-
liability applied to Metal Ware. Further, there was never any pursuit by Appellants of the 
traditional exceptions to non-liability in the U.S. District Court, and therefore no evidence 
of any such theories. The four traditional exceptions were not even preserved for appeal 
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to the Tenth Circuit, and their applicability is not a certified issue. 
Metal Ware owed no duty of care to the Tabors under the product line or 
continuity of enterprise theories, two minority theories that this Court should expressly 
reject and refuse to follow as the court of appeals directed in Decius. Additionally, no 
duty of care was owed by Metal Ware to the Tabors under the independent duty to warn 
theory; there is no relationship between Metal Ware and the Tabors, much less an 
independent, special relationship between them based upon substantial and meaningful 
contact. 
Finally, all of the foregoing presumes a recently discovered defect that had 
not yet been addressed still existed for Metal Ware to warn against. Appellants ignore the 
fact that the 1995 USCPSC recall was a warning about the defect, and that the recall had 
been closed before Metal Ware had any involvement at all with American Harvest. The 
"defect" at issue in this case was several years old, and had been addressed by the recall 
procedures required by the USCPSC. In the end, there was no duty to warn in this case, 
and there was no effective way to communicate a warning to the Tabors even if the duty 
existed because Metal Ware had no idea they existed at all and because the testimony of 
the ShopKo representative, Ms. Schroeder, demonstrated that a warning to ShopKo would 
not have reached the Tabors anyway. In the end, how was Metal Ware supposed to know 
that ShopKo sold a defective unit subject to the recall more than a year after the recall 
required such units to be off of its shelves, much less that a Utah ShopKo sold it to the 
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Tabors? Shopko and Englewood saw this problem, and settled with the Appellants for 
several hundred thousand dollars. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah should continue to adhere to the traditional, majority rule. As 
minority, non-traditional exceptions, the product line and continuity of enterprise are ill-
conceived and cause far greater problems than they would remedy. Additionally, the 
independent duty to warn should not be adopted. If this Court does adopt the independent 
duty to warn theory, it should be narrowly tailored as it has been in other jurisdictions. 
Irrespective of the outcome of any of the certified questions, Metal Ware was properly 
dismissed by the U.S. District Court. 
Dated this 3 1 ^ day of October 2006. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Brian C. Webber 
Attorneys for The Metal Ware Corporation 
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